Andres Ortiz: "I have seen first-hand that it is very easy to contact the Islamic State via the Internet"

These and many other questions have been asked by Andrés Ortiz Moyano (#YIHAD. Cómo el Estado Islámico ha conquistado Internet y los medios de comunicación (Editorial UOC). Ortiz describes the research as "harrowing" but assures that he has never felt afraid and that he is optimistic: "The Islamic State propagates on the Internet an image of greater strength than it really has; it does this very well, but it is weaker than it seems". The solution? "More education, common sense and reconciliation policies".

How does the Islamic State use the Internet?

It exploits the full potential of Internet to achieve its ends. It transmits a broad spectrum of messages, pursuing different purposes, and, unlike other terrorist activities that we have seen in the past, the Jihadists are perfectly willing to use all the channels offered by the new technologies, from social media to mobile phone apps, programming, audiovisual content, etc. They have realized that their messages are much more impacting when they use the techniques of modern Western communication than when they use more traditional routes.

In your book, you talk about cyber-Jihad and a very sophisticated media strategy...

Cyber-Jihad is the term I use to refer to the enormous communication network that they operate. They use specific communication resources to recruit, others to create terror propaganda, others to attract women, children, teenagers, etc. They even reach out to affluent adults, using philosophical messages about salvation mixed with promises of extreme opulence: houses, women, cars, etc. This spectrum is based on a frenetic activity on the Internet and a more than passing knowledge of ways to get their messages across to their victims.

In fact, at one point you talk about the figure of "terror community manager".

Yes, I owe this concept to the analyst David Barrancos. They are very proficient in the use of Twitter, for example, and know perfectly well which messages are shared most and why, which hashtags work best at any given time, even if they are completely unrelated with their message, etc. But you don't need to go to university to know that. During the Brazil World Cup, for example, they disseminated Jihadist messages using the most popular hashtags related with the World Cup. Simply by using these hashtags, their messages went around the world. This shows that they take their work very seriously and they know what they are doing. The technologies are cheap, even free, which makes them a very effective propaganda tool for terror, in this case.

Cannot governments or the operators themselves detect these accounts or profiles and shut them down?

Yes, they can, and they do. However, in spite of the strict security controls implemented by companies and governments, the very nature of these technologies enables them to get round these obstacles and reach audiences of millions of people. In addition, the Islamic State has shown an amazing ability to adapt in the use of new technologies. In 2014, there was a shift in strategy: until then, their activity was deliberately visible, with profiles with lots of followers, with a strong propagation power but easily detected by the police or by social media operators, such as Twitter. All of these profiles were eventually shut down. So the Jihadists changed tactics and, since 2014, their activity is much more subtle, with profiles with less followers and which, by definition, are much harder – although not impossible – to detect. For example, when Jihadist profiles on Facebook started to be shut down, they moved to another social medium that was becoming very popular, called Diaspora. What makes Diaspora different is that it is an open-source, decentralized social medium, which makes it much more difficult to detect and identify Jihadist activities. This is just one example of Jihad's ability to adapt and the importance conceded by the organization to their communication and information technology specialists.

How can we identify an account as belonging to a member of the Islamic State?

As I have said, there were – and still are – accounts that stand out for their outright brutality, publishing photos of murderers and terrorist acts, among others. These are easy to identify. But aside from those, there are licit accounts that align with the principles expressed by the Jihadists. This is something that is happening more and more on Twitter. There are lots of accounts that pay tribute or homage to great emirs of modern terrorism. These accounts are not so easy to close. For example: you create an account to review Stalin's life. This means that you have to talk about concentration camps, the racial minorities that were slaughtered in the Soviet Union, etc. All of this can be considered history, a licit way to transmit messages that explain history. They no longer use the communication media for untargeted, chaotic actions; they now know how to use them effectively.

This ability to make such effective use of social media and publish such well-made videos means that very capable, professional people are involved...

Yes, it has been shown that many members of the Islamic State's communication centre are graduates from Western universities and colleges. However, there is one point that needs to be clarified here: many Islamic State members are Jordanians and Jordan, as a country, has achieved a certain level of development and education. Not all terrorists have been educated at the Paris Sorbonne. And we're not talking about Quantum Physics either. Anyone can quickly learn how the social media work and how to optimize them for a particular purpose. However, it's clear that the Islamic State sees communication and IT as vitally important: the Islamic State's journalists, reporters and IT specialists are much better paid than its soldiers, for example. The head of communication holds the title of emir. But the most interesting thing about this approach is that they have managed to project an image of the Islamic State that, in my opinion, is not backed by actual reality. I think that the Islamic State is much weaker than we think.

Do you mean to say that, thanks to the Internet, they have managed to look stronger than they actually are?

Yes, they are not as powerful as they would like us to believe. They make mistakes in their strategy, but they are very good at transmitting an image of invincibility, because their terror tactics are extreme and they are very good at displaying them in all their horror on the social media, with a cold-bloodedness that initially was not part of their hallmark. The danger is that anyone can access the content they disseminate on the Internet, so we need to educate people so that they are aware that this content is dangerous, posted by dangerous people.

What do you think we should do to combat the Islamic State?

Well, that's a very complicated question. To start with, bombing Syria is not the solution. It is typical of the West to retaliate with more bombs every time there is a terrorist attack. I'm not saying that it shouldn't be done but it is obvious that the model applied in Iraq has not worked. More effort must be made in education, prevention and reconciliation policies both in the West and in the countries in conflict. In those countries, for example, many children have close family who have died in the conflict. Unless good policies are made, these children or teenagers may end up becoming terrorists themselves, because they will probably be drawn in with other strategies. That is their strength. Providing a good education and implementing good reconciliation policies is expensive. But it's what needs to be done.

One of the main activities which the Islamic State carries out on the Internet is precisely to recruit new terrorists. How does it do it?

It uses two ways: on one hand, there are the accounts that claim that they belong to the Islamic State and openly offer the possibility of joining it. It's very simple: in fact, I contacted one of these recruiters, who had opened several accounts precisely for this purpose.

You were looking for him. Was it easy?

Yes, it was relatively easy to find him. They are recruiters that share content and are continuously offering you the option of joining them. And, on the other hand, there are the trackers, who take the step of contacting victims and not the other way round, as was my case. I'll give you an example: a French journalist presented herself as a Muslim woman and, using a false profile that she had created herself for this very purpose, said that she felt very lonely, ill-treated by the society she was living in, and, over a period of four or five days, published a number of Jihadist messages. They immediately contacted her. They always have the radars watching to know who to talk with, where and when. And, in this scenario, the goal is very clear. Consequently, it makes much more sense for them to focus on young French Muslims, for example, than middle-aged people living in North Italy, to give another example. They've got it down to a fine art.

You also talk about the Deep Web in the book and how the Jihadists use it. What does it consist of?

The Deep Web is a parallel Internet that is much larger than the conventional Internet we all use. It is used, for example, as an enormous database and one of its features is that it leaves no trail, which, generally speaking, is a good thing. But within the Deep Web, there is a small part – which, in proportion, is really very small, but very notorious – which is the "Dark Web". This is the place where drug dealing, prostitution, arms selling and other illicit activities go on. And it is here that the Islamic State has a huge universe in which to do its nefarious work and a vast black market to buy arms, create recruitment forums, etc. If Internet already has some level of anonymity, just imagine what the Deep Web is like!

How do you get there?

It's really very simple. No specific training is required; I was able to do it myself. There are a number of ways, but it's enough to download the Tor browser, for example. But nobody should be shocked. The Deep Web is not a bad thing in itself! I would be against shutting it down. Once again, what needs to be done is to educate people so that they know where they are and know how to consume Internet contents. I was able to enter very easily and I have seen for myself that it is very easy to use the Internet to contact Jihadist networks. Anyone can do it. The only thing that makes me different from anyone else is that I had a purpose, I was researching, but anyone can do it. In other words, I have knocked on a door and it was opened. What I haven't done is cross to the other side. But anyone who wants to can cross and that's why our job now is basically to forewarn, particularly in the areas of education and common sense. We need to strip the Islamic State of its mystique, stop being afraid of it and, at the same time, educate our societies so that no-one will cross through that door.

Talking about fear, have you ever felt afraid doing your research?

No, I haven't felt afraid but I have consumed the most brutal content that human beings can create, and that has affected my relationships and my daily life. And it has made me think: if a teenager, for example, consumes all that, I don't know how he or she could react, it could be very dangerous. That is why I think it's so important to devote resources to education.